A method development of incentive fee for ship equipment scheduled repair
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摘要:
目的 旨在解决舰船装备计划修理一直采用定价成本加5%利润的成本加成定价方法且未与质量、进度挂钩、以及难以全面激励承修单位提升修理效益的问题。 方法 选择成本、质量、进度作为激励因素,将成本区分为固定和激励约束两部分来设计成本激励金,剔除甲方造成的拖期设计进度激励金,以及根据舰船装备计划修理特点建立质量特性评价指标体系,以此设计质量激励金。 结果 算例分析结果表明,承修单位通过成本、进度、质量激励金获得合理的利润激励,综合绩效较好的项目可以突破5%的利润率限制。 结论 通过建立此激励金,可有效促使承修单位控制成本、提高质量、加快进度,对完善装备激励定价机制、提高舰船装备计划修理效益具有重要的现实意义。 Abstract:Objectives The "cost plus 5% profit" pricing method has been adopted for ship equipment scheduled repair for many years, but it does not reflect quality and schedule of repair project, so it is unable to motivate contractors to cost-effectively improve their repair work. Methods This paper chooses cost, schedule and quality as the incentive factors, and develops an incentive fee method which distinguishes between the fixed and incentive parts of the cost, with a schedule-based incentive fee to encourage the elimination of delays by Party A and a quality-based incentive fee to encourage the construction of a quality evaluation index based on the features of ship equipment scheduled repair. Results The example analyses show that the contractors can thus earn reasonable profits from contracts adopting this method, Among the examples,projects with better overall performance can break the 5% profit margin limit. Conclusions The method put forward in this paper can effectively motivate contractors to control their costs, improve their quality and accelerate their schedule. This is of great practical significance for perfecting the incentive fee mechanism and promoting effective ship equipment scheduled repair. -
Key words:
- ship equipment /
- scheduled maintenance /
- incentive fee
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表 1 指标权重
Table 1. Indexes weight
目标值 一级指标 指标权重 二级指标 指标权重 装备修理质量特性 甲方满意度 0.372 技术服务满意度 0.341 部队使用满意度 0.386 修理返工率 0.273 质量合格率 0.309 物料质量合格率 0.539 分包项目合格率 0.297 检验验收合格率 0.164 企业管理水平 0.156 领导者重视程度 0.292 管理者工作能力 0.301 员工培训率 0.407 生产技术水平 0.163 人员素质 0.330 器材设备 0.329 技术资料 0.341 表 2 专家评估汇总表
Table 2. Summary of expert evaluation
一级指标 二级指标 评价等级 很好 较好 一般 较差 很差 甲方满意度 技术服务满意度 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0 部队使用满意度 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 修理返工率 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.2 0 质量合格率 物料质量合格率 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.1 0 分包项目合格率 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.1 0 检验验收合格率 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.1 企业管理水平 领导者重视程度 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.1 管理者工作能力 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0 员工培训率 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.1 生产技术水平 人员素质 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0 器材设备 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.1 0 技术资料 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.1 表 3 装备质量评价等级与质量激励金系数
Table 3. Equipment quality evaluation ratings and quality incentive index
装备评价等级 装备质量特性评估得分 质量激励金系数/% 很好 80~100 4 较好 60~80 2 一般 40~60 0 较差 20~40 −2 差 0~20 −4 -
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