舰船装备计划修理激励金设计

魏华; 王翀

doi:10.19693/j.issn.1673-3185.02298

舰船装备计划修理激励金设计

doi: 10.19693/j.issn.1673-3185.02298

魏华^1, ,,
王翀²

1.
海军工程大学管理工程与装备经济系, 湖北武汉 430033
2.
海军装备部, 北京 100071

基金项目: 国家社会科学基金项目(18BGL287)

详细信息

作者简介:
魏华，男，1981年生，博士，讲师。研究方向：装备价格管理。E-mail：weih81@163.com

王翀，男，1981年生，硕士，工程师

通信作者:
魏华

中图分类号: U672.7⁺1; F224.31
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- 被引次数: 0
出版历程
- 收稿日期: 2021-02-22
- 修回日期: 2021-03-31
- 网络出版日期: 2021-11-23
- 刊出日期: 2021-12-20

A method development of incentive fee for ship equipment scheduled repair

Hua WEI^{1
, ,},
Chong WANG²

1.
Department of Management Engineering and Equipment Economics, Naval University of Engineering, Wuhan 430033, China
2.
Naval Armament Department of PLAN, Beijing 100071, China

舰船装备计划修理激励金设计由魏华，等创作，采用知识共享署名4.0国际许可协议进行许可。

摘要

摘要: 目的旨在解决舰船装备计划修理一直采用定价成本加5%利润的成本加成定价方法且未与质量、进度挂钩、以及难以全面激励承修单位提升修理效益的问题。方法选择成本、质量、进度作为激励因素，将成本区分为固定和激励约束两部分来设计成本激励金，剔除甲方造成的拖期设计进度激励金，以及根据舰船装备计划修理特点建立质量特性评价指标体系，以此设计质量激励金。结果算例分析结果表明，承修单位通过成本、进度、质量激励金获得合理的利润激励，综合绩效较好的项目可以突破5%的利润率限制。结论通过建立此激励金，可有效促使承修单位控制成本、提高质量、加快进度，对完善装备激励定价机制、提高舰船装备计划修理效益具有重要的现实意义。
- 舰船装备 /
- 计划修理 /
- 激励金
Abstract: Objectives The "cost plus 5% profit" pricing method has been adopted for ship equipment scheduled repair for many years, but it does not reflect quality and schedule of repair project, so it is unable to motivate contractors to cost-effectively improve their repair work. Methods This paper chooses cost, schedule and quality as the incentive factors, and develops an incentive fee method which distinguishes between the fixed and incentive parts of the cost, with a schedule-based incentive fee to encourage the elimination of delays by Party A and a quality-based incentive fee to encourage the construction of a quality evaluation index based on the features of ship equipment scheduled repair. Results The example analyses show that the contractors can thus earn reasonable profits from contracts adopting this method, Among the examples,projects with better overall performance can break the 5% profit margin limit. Conclusions The method put forward in this paper can effectively motivate contractors to control their costs, improve their quality and accelerate their schedule. This is of great practical significance for perfecting the incentive fee mechanism and promoting effective ship equipment scheduled repair.
- ship equipment /
- scheduled maintenance /
- incentive fee

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图 1 装备修理质量特性评价指标体系

Figure 1. Evaluation index system of equipment repair quality characteristics

下载: 全尺寸图片幻灯片

表 1 指标权重

Table 1. Indexes weight

目标值	一级指标	指标权重	二级指标	指标权重
装备修理质量特性	甲方满意度	0.372	技术服务满意度	0.341
			部队使用满意度	0.386
			修理返工率	0.273
	质量合格率	0.309	物料质量合格率	0.539
			分包项目合格率	0.297
			检验验收合格率	0.164
	企业管理水平	0.156	领导者重视程度	0.292
			管理者工作能力	0.301
			员工培训率	0.407
	生产技术水平	0.163	人员素质	0.330
			器材设备	0.329
			技术资料	0.341

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表 2 专家评估汇总表

Table 2. Summary of expert evaluation

一级指标	二级指标	评价等级
一级指标	二级指标	很好	较好	一般	较差	很差
甲方满意度	技术服务满意度	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.2	0
	部队使用满意度	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.1
	修理返工率	0.1	0.3	0.4	0.2	0
质量合格率	物料质量合格率	0.3	0.4	0.2	0.1	0
	分包项目合格率	0.2	0.4	0.3	0.1	0
	检验验收合格率	0.1	0.3	0.4	0.1	0.1
企业管理水平	领导者重视程度	0.1	0.2	0.4	0.2	0.1
	管理者工作能力	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.2	0
	员工培训率	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.1
生产技术水平	人员素质	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.2	0
	器材设备	0.2	0.4	0.3	0.1	0
	技术资料	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.1

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表 3 装备质量评价等级与质量激励金系数

Table 3. Equipment quality evaluation ratings and quality incentive index

装备评价等级	装备质量特性评估得分	质量激励金系数/%
很好	80~100	4
较好	60~80	2
一般	40~60	0
较差	20~40	−2
差	0~20	−4

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参考文献(12)

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